Research Article: Pan-Arabism, The Double-Edged Sword
Wracked by instability and violence, the Middle East has certainly earned a befitting reputation as a hotbed of conflict, both on a regional and international level. Conquered and carved up by Imperialist powers after fall of the Ottoman Empire, the now-divided region was destined to be weak and unstable for centuries to come- or was it? From the fractured, divided remnants of a great Islamic empire rose a powerful ideology. An ideology which had the potential to alleviate the chronic volatility of the region- and to unify the fragmented pieces that had seen so much conflict as a lasting consequence of their Imperialist division and subsequent domination. A salient and germane ideology, Pan Arabism may very well hold the key to solving the central problem in the Arab world today, legitimacy.
However, despite its ideological popularity, Pan Arabism has made little headway in lessening the tensions, either within or radiating from the Middle East. Upon closer exploration of the Pan Arabist ideology, we will find that, despite its peace-making potential, Pan Arabism falls prey to numerous shortcomings and deficiencies, as historical analysis will demonstrate. Past failures beg the question ‘Will the ideology, implemented in today’s society, be able to overcome these shortcomings and alleviate the regional tensions? Or will it succumb to the imperialist legacy of fragmentation, strife, and weakness?’ In order to find the answer to these questions, we will delve into the history of the ideology and its applications in the past. We will investigate the roots of the current legitimacy crisis in the Middle East, and what solutions Pan Arabism has to offer. In doing so, we will come across the unfavorable consequences of the ideology, both for the West/non- Arabs and for the Arabs themselves.
In order to fully understand the current legitimacy problem in the Middle East, it is necessary to contextualize the issue in a brief historical précis, beginning at the origin of the problem. Through the lens of history, we can retrospectively identify flaws in Pan Arabism, and analyze their relevance to contemporary application of the ideology. The roots of today’s unrest in the Middle Eastern mainly stem from the actions of Imperialist powers at the start of the twentieth century.2 During World War I, in an attempt to solicit Arab aid in bringing down the Ottoman Turkish Empire, Great Britain enlisted the help of Sharif Hussein of Mecca, whom the British believed was a prominent figure among Arabs. In return for his role in rousing Arab resistance against the Turks, the British promised Sharif Hussein control of an independent Arab nation. This marked the first attempt at implementing Pan Arabism. Hussein agreed, but following the fall of the Ottoman Turkish Empire, the British reneged upon their promise. Instead, divisions and colonialism, not independence and unity, were the legacy of British promises. This betrayal set the foundation for the pervasive anti-West sentiment prevalent in the region today. Together with the French, in the process of Imperial competition, the region was carved into multitude of smaller states fated to be weak, harboring irredentist incompatibilities. This, and continued Imperialist rule, would mark the start of what would become years of imperialist European control.
And still, despite the failure of the creation of an independent Arab nation, the dream of Arab unity remained in the form of a hopeful ideology until the post World War II era, with the rise of Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser. A combination of the collapse of the Ottoman state, dissatisfaction with imposition of borders, continued Western imperialism, and the colonization of Palestine, led to an Arab nationalist movement which preached the doctrine that Arabs constituted a nation entitled to an independent state or, if several states, that these ought to be grouped in an Arab national confederation. In the mid-1950’s Pan Arabism flourished through Nasser, who became a pan Arab hero, acclaimed for his successful opposition and assertion of independence from Anglo-US grip. For a time, Pan Arabism, enforced by Egyptian hegemony, quieted the inter- state conflict, produced a relatively autonomous regional system, and maximized the region’s stature in the international system. The post World War II era also saw the creation of the Arab League, a collective union of Arab states. Ultimately however, Pan Arab power struggles and outbidding, induced by anti-Hegemonic balancing, led to a humiliating defeat of the Arab armies in the 1967 war with Israel, which shattered the ideological hegemony of Pan Arabism and led to its subsequent decline.
Apart from several brief revivals of Arab cooperation, including a few more unsuccessful attacks on Israel, Pan Arabism faded into the background of the Middle Eastern scene. Most notably, a brief revival occurred during the 1970s and 1980s, driven by an oil boom which promoted inter-state cooperation through trans-state movements of Arab laborers and capital. Oil potentially offered the opportunity to overcome economic dependency and stimulate Pan-Arab economic development. However, this aim was never realized, as oil wealth further divided the states into rich or poor. As it remains, Pan Arabism was unable to produce a lasting effect, and issues of irredentism, lack of legitimacy, and frustration with Western Imperialism continue to destabilize Middle Eastern politics.
Lack of legitimacy remains the Arab world’s central problem today and the “umbrella issue” under which many of the other types of regional and international conflicts are nested. Ted Gurr classifies regimes as legitimate “to the extent that their citizens regard them as proper and deserving of support.” Whether a regime is regarded as such depends upon it being genuinely national, partaking of the nation’s history, acting in accordance with the society’s values, and protecting the society’s broadest concerns. Why, then, does the Arab world find itself severely lacking legitimacy?
To respond to this question, it is necessary to refer back to the previously outlined roots of historical conflict, back to Western Imperialism’s “arbitrary imposition of state boundaries.” This produced a deeply ingrained irredentism among the peoples living within these borders, in which the forced amalgamations of conflicting groups of people created a “substantial incongruence between territory and identity” This imposition of incongruent borders created a legitimacy problem, as “legitimate authority is hard to develop within state structures whose boundaries are inherently incompatible with those of the nation.” In addition, the lack of legitimacy is further exacerbated within individual states, by conflicting regimes pursuing their own state interests which are often incompatible with those of the unrepresented remaining groups within the state’s borders. As a result of this, “at least half of the Arab countries exhibit politically salient (often conflict-ridden) divisions.” Moreover, continued penetration and “meddling” of Western Imperialist powers, within state government, further de-legitimizes existing regimes, as Western influence is neither genuinely national, nor does it act in accordance with the society’s values or protect its broadest concerns.
We have identified the sources of the Middle East’s lack of legitimacy. This leads us to the issue of how lack of legitimacy, in turn, contributes to the existing conflict in the Middle East. Lack of legitimacy is often responsible for Arab leadership being regarded as cruel, repressive, and often irrational. Regimes have been connected with violent coup d’etats, assassinations, and official repression. Due to these conditions, there is a “widespread negative attitude, even fear, toward government among ordinary people. Certainly legitimacy does not excuse their violent actions, but it does provide a basis from which a regime’s or leader’s actions can be understood. Legitimacy, is fueled by popular support, which includes respect for both government and government rules. A regime’s political survival is highly dependent upon its legitimacy. However, because “Arab politicians must operate in a political environment in which the legitimacy of rulers, regimes, and the institutions of the states themselves is sporadic and, at best, scarce,” leaders must engage in this seemingly irrational or cruel behavior in order to ensure their own political survival. Thus, the shortage of legitimacy “largely accounts for the volatile nature of Arab politics.” In addition, legitimacy, and subsequently political stability, is also induced by regimes expressing the state’s beliefs, values, and interests. However, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, because of the forced convergence of conflicting identities within a state’s borders, it is nearly impossible for a leader to represent all of the interests of the groups within the state. Incidents of conflicting interests promote rebellion and violence, which de-legitimize existing regimes even further. Consequently, in the Middle East, peace is intimately interconnected with legitimacy rights.
This brings us to the core focus of our analysis: What are the ways in which Pan Arabism can solve the legitimacy problem in the Middle East? Some views of Pan Arabism call for political unification of existing Arab states, as a merging into one Arab nation. More generally, however, Pan Arabism can entail unity and cooperation between Arab states on the basis of shared language, culture and history. We will focus on the latter concept, as state fragmentation appears largely irreversible. In this sense, Pan Arabism would function more as an international society rather than a homogenous nation. Sovereign states would be embedded in a supra-state community, where state actors must respond to both the dynamics of the state system and to the norms of shared identity. It would embody al-Husri’s desire for a shared awareness of Arabism, with which Arabs would be inspired to seek political unification. This unification, or coordination between states, would focus specifically on the core issues of rejection of Western domination, defense of the Palestinian cause, and most importantly, the expectation that Arab states should act in concert in world politics, in defense of all-Arab interests, as well as providing a means to resolve inter-state conflict arbitrarily.
Pan Arabism, in the form of a supra-state community, would embody a general Arab identity, grounded in cultural similarity, shared history, common language , shared concerns or interests, and the already-present widespread feeling of belonging to a distinct Arab world.
Accordingly, “Order in state systems may be built on shared identity and norms where an ‘international society’ is emerging” Therefore, the shared identity and norms posited by Pan Arabism would contribute to a greater stability within the region. Alternatively, peace and order may also be obtained through a “sufficient interdependence of interests.” Pan Arabism fulfills this condition, in its endorsement of unification and coordination between Arab states. The element of oil within Arab nations is an example of interdependence of interests, as it can generate trans-state movements of labor and capital, as demonstrated during the 1970’s oil boom. The issues of Palestinian Liberation and rejection of the West exhibit interdependences of interests, as well. Sufficient interdependence of interests can also lessen some states’ dependence on the West, and promote greater autonomy and self-sufficiency in the region, as well as allowing for national self- determination. Legitimacy, here, is fostered by order and stability. Additionally, Pan Arabism furthers legitimacy even more so by promoting a sense of community. People must feel a sense of political community, or communal solidarity in order for legitimacy to succeed. In this sense, a Pan Arabist community would tie together and endorse core Arab values and goals, to help promote legitimacy and stability within the region.
As the saying goes, ‘with the good comes the bad.’ Despite the potentially favorable effects of present-day implementation of Pan Arabism, the ideology still fails to provide a solution to other important issues. In addition, there have been few alterations to the ideology which would remedy the problems it came across in the past. Unless these ‘mistakes’ are learned from and corrected, Pan Arabism could see history repeat itself.
One of the greatest issues facing Pan Arabism in contemporary society is the tension between the Arab world and the West. In this area, not only does Pan Arabism fail to provide a solution, it may also aggravate the problem. Challenging Western influence is understandable, due to past grievances and a desire for full independence, but to what degree? The degree of rejection of Western influence posited by several Pan Arabist supporters may be harmful to all parties involved. For example, animosity towards the West can induce militant anti-Western sentiment, specifically anti-US radicalism, which may result in further violence. Furthermore, Pan Arabism’s rejection of Western values can include principles necessary to promote peace and benefits for the Arab peoples, such as equality, democracy, and modernization. As seen in the past, Pan Arabism’s policy of hostility towards the West may also jeopardize states that wish to have relations with the west. Raymond Hinnebusch discusses the grave political liabilities for the West’s clients, in overtly identifying with the West. In fact, the 1977 summit organized to isolate Egypt after President Anwar Sadat’s visit to Israel, demonstrate how West-friendly nations were bullied and ostracized by their fellow Arab states. Such domestic threats may force Arab states to reject the West, despite perhaps needing it. Hence, despite the fact that, in the past, Pan Arabism helped establish a relatively autonomous regional system, it had no mechanism for bridging the Arab-non-Arab gap.
Another important issue facing Pan Arabism concerns the power struggles and outbidding it inadvertently facilitates. This phenomenon was exhibited during Nasser’s time, where anti- Hegemonic balancing occurred in response to Egypt’s threatening leadership. Outbidding and power struggles during that time not only led to discord and violence, but they also set the stage for radical or militant nationalism, as leaders struggled to outdo each other in “ideological competition.” During the 1960’s, outbidding led to rash decision-making, specifically in the case of the 1967 war with Israel, where foreign policy rationality was sacrificed due to greater domestic threats than those abroad. Arab states feared public opinion for non-intervention, despite knowledge of probable failure. Such factors pose a risky threat to peace in the region. In implementing Pan Arabism, leaders may also face conflict of interest. While Arab states have consolidated their sovereignty in the face of supra-state ideology, legitimacy still requires their leaders to balance between the two. Leaders often find themselves torn between, sometimes conflicting, interests of state and nation. This incongruence between nation-loyalty and state (sovereign) loyalty, as set forth by the externally imposed Westphalian system, could lead to exploitation of Pan Arabism for domestic purposes. As it was in the past, Arabist ideology is sometimes used to legitimize state-centric policies. Similarly, as with any political leadership, Pan Arabism is subject to the corruption of officials and self-serving regimes which exploit the ideology for personal gain.
As for the problems facing the creation of Legitimacy in the Middle East, it appears that Pan Arabism is challenged by ‘theory versus practice.’ Supporters of Pan Arabism “talk the talk,” but when it comes to “walking the walk” they often fall short. The Pan Arabist movement lacks solid, institutional underpinnings in a variety of aspects essential to implementation of the ideology. Specifically, the main component of Pan Arab ideology, which assumes common values among the Arab people is sorely lacking when put into practice. As it stands, there has been little or no such consensus on Pan Arab values. Similarly, in implementation of Pan Arabism, rules and practices have not been set down or spelled out as of yet, largely due to lack of agreement between advocates of the ideology, but also due to the reluctance of many authoritarian leaders to risk sacrificing their power to a larger order. Thus despite the fact that, in many ways, Pan Arabism is a potentially noble idea, in many cases it fails to match words with deeds.
Such problems with the ideology show that its potential flaws are as great as its prospective successes. Yet Arab nationalism remains a strong hope in the hearts of many Arab people. “Pan Arabism recalls the historical memories of greatness under unity and the success of Arabs when they act together. The Arab people have a rich cultural heritage and much to contribute to the world. However, fragmentation and disorder wreaked upon the region by Western Imperialism left a lasting legacy of conflict and volatility. “Arab nationalism responded to a profound yearning to overcome divisions and weaknesses in the Arab world, which had subjected them to constant conflicts, foreign domination, and had robbed them of glory.” Unfortunately, however, Pan Arabism exists as a positive and hopeful ideology- but in the domain of reality, it fails to live up to its expectations. Until past mistakes are learned from and corrected, Pan Arabism will be grounded in repetition of history, and subsequent failure.